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RESPONDING TO HERRERA V. COLLINS: ENSURING
THAT INNOCENTS ARE NOT EXECUTED
I. INTRODUCTION'
"Death is ... different."2 Since the Supreme Court decision
in Furman v. Georgia invalidating all state death penalty statutes,3
the American system of capital punishment has been held to a
higher standard of reliability. Due to the nature of the punishment
itself and the procedural safeguards it is expected to carry,4 the
administration of capital punishment deserves the closest scrutiny.
If the death penalty is carried out unjustly, then what does that say
about the rest of the American justice system? This Note will ex-
amine the most egregious error in death penalty cases: a failure to
ensure that innocent persons have not been sentenced to die.
In Herrera v. Collins,' the Supreme Court held that a capital
defendant is not entitled to federal habeas corpus review for a
claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
unless there is an independent constitutional violation. While those
who see the habeas process as a perversion of justice due to its
delay and expense6 heralded the decision, the decision also ini-
1. This note utilizes only male pronouns throughout. Female pronouns would be
misleading in the context of capital defendants since 98% of the prisoners in death
penalty litigation are male. Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpns as a Safety Valve for
Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 415, 415 (1990-1991).
2. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). The Court further stated
that "[d]eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison
term differs from one of only a year or two." Id. at 305.
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the means of applying the State of Georgia's
death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). This decision invalidated
all state death penalty statutes and vacated the sentences of over 600 death row inmates.
Id. at 316.
4. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (reasoning that due to the qualitative difference between
a sentence of death and a sentence of life imprisonment, the imposition of the death
penalty deserves extra reliability).
5. 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993).
6. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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tiated a public outcry. The nation was stunned that a capital defen-
dant alleging new evidence of innocence could not obtain review
from federal courts since a claim of innocence is not a constitu-
tional claim. Newspapers across the nation were flooded with harsh
criticisms of the Herrera decision: "state murder,".7 "[m]urder by
the highest court in the land,"8 "[t]he error of this decision ...
will be measured in lives,".9  "callous and cruel,"'" "expediency
over justice . . . the court [has] further cheapened its already de-
graded view of the value of life,"" "deplorable illogic,"'2  a
"ghoulish" decision that is a casual disregard for the power of life
and death,"' 3 "unconscionable . .. stupid and pernicious,"' 4 "alle-
giance to procedure above . . . justice,"' 5 "a slap in the face" to
the legacy of Thurgood Marshall,'6 the Supreme Court is a
"stickler for rules,"' 7 and the federal courts are "too busy" for
constitutional protection. 8 Few recent Supreme Court decisions
have garnered such vigorous attacks. 9 In response to this deci-
sion, Congress has proposed a statutory provision which would
override Herrera."0
This Note examines whether Senate Bill 1441, the Habeas
Corpus Reform Act of 1993,21 and its provision allowing for re-
7. James C. Harrington, Court Has Made It Easier to Execute Innocent, HOUSTON
CHRON., Feb. 4, 1993, at A25.
8. Nat Hentoff, When Guilt or Innocence 'Doesn't Matter', WASH. POST, Feb. 13,
1993, at A31.
9. Don't Make It Easier to Execute the Innocent, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 1993, at
10A.
10. Not Guilty? It Doesn't Matter, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Jan. 28, 1993, at A12.
11. Perilously Close to Murder, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 1993, at 2C.
12. Appalling Limit on Death Appeals, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 30, 1993, at B6.
13. See Rehnquist Court's Unseemly Zeal for Executions, NEWSDAY, Jan. 28, 1993, at
52.
14. Rehnquist's Catch-22, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 28, 1993, at B6.
15. Guilty Regardless of New Evidence, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 1, 1993, at CI0.
16. Kathy Fair, Death Penalty Foes Decry Rulings, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 26, 1993,
at A19.
17. Marshall Ingwerson, Supreme Court Limits Death-Penally Appeals, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, Jan. 27, 1993, at 2.
18. 'Actual Innocence' and Death, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at 14A.
19. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (denying petitioner's request to
refuse medical treatment); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a woman's right
to have an abortion).
20. David G. Savage, Plan Could Let Condemned Get Hearing for Fresh Facts, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at A12.
21. S. 1441, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter S. 1441]. Section V explains
that Senate Bill 1441 did not pass in the 103rd Congress. See infra notes 150-52 and
accompanying text. Another Senate bill, Senate Bill 1657, contains the same provision
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view of new evidence claims in death penalty cases, answers the
protests that followed Herrera. Section II will detail the importance
of federal habeas corpus doctrine. Section III examines the Herrera
decision itself. Section IV surveys treatment of Herrera in subse-
quent cases. Section V demonstrates that innocents are in fact exe-
cuted in the United States. Section VI critically analyzes the provi-
sions of Senate Bill 1441, and Section VII presents an alternative
proposal to Senate Bill 1441 that more effectively reduces the risk
of executing innocents in the United States.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Providing a habeas corpus hearing for claims of innocence
based on new facts is essential given that appeals to federal courts
are the most effective vehicle a capital defendant has to ensure due
process.' As the following facts indicate, the state systems are
unreliable and clemency is not the "fail-safe" it is claimed to be.'
A. A Brief Explanation of Federal Habeas Corpus
Federal habeas corpus,24 "the Great Writ,"'  is a right pro-
vided for in the suspension clause of the Constitution." It is so
critical to the rights of criminal defendants that it has been called a
"'safety valve' for innocent defendants."'27 With the 1953 case of
Brown v. Allen,2" habeas corpus relief began expanding, in part, to
allowing for review of new evidence claims, however, reference will only be made to
Senate Bill 1441 since it was the original bill. See S. 1657, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter S. 1657].
22. See discussion infra parts II.B-C. Even if one is not persuaded of the deficiencies
of the state criminal justice system and executive clemency, an extra check on these
processes serves to reduce the fallibility of the system and to ensure fairness.
23. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 (1993).
24. Federal habeas corpus gives state prisoners the right to collaterally attack their
conviction in federal court if a constitutional claim is involved. Federal habeas corpus is
the only real means state defendants have of obtaining federal review since direct review
by the Supreme Court is highly unlikely. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 33.01 (2d ed. 1986).
25. This phrase was used to refer to the writ of habeas corpus by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95-100 (1807).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing "[tihe privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.") The right to federal habeas corpus is now codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-55 (1988).
27. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 415.
28. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (establishing that federal habeas corpus included all federal
constitutional claims raised by state prisoners).
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achieve uniformity in federal constitutional law.29  Following
Brown, a series of cases further broadened federal habeas corpus,
most notably the 1963 case of Fay v. Noia °.3  As a result of this
expansion, federal habeas corpus has come to play such a major
role in protecting state criminal defendants' constitutional rights,
and especially capital defendants' constitutional rights, that some
states' rights advocates have questioned its use." Its importance to
the rights of death row inmates has made habeas corpus the center
of an intense debate alleging that the capital appeals process takes
too long. 2 The debate is waged in courts over finality, in legisla-
tures over expenses, and, most prominently, among the American
people over justice.33
In legal circles, three principal arguments are asserted for re-
stricting federal habeas corpus: a desire to promote "comity" be-
tween the state and federal systems, the need for finality in crimi-
nal convictions, and the goal of decreasing the burdens on federal
court dockets 4.3  Protectors of the Great Writ focus on the impor-
tance of individual liberty and the safeguards provided by federal
habeas corpus.35 Those who would like to restrict federal habeas
corpus are currently winning the battle with legislative proposals
29. Id. at 510.
30. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (allowing a prisoner to make claims in habeas that had
not been made in the state court so long as the state procedures were not deliberately
avoided), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
31. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Starting From Scratch: Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of
Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 133, 134 (1992). See also Vivian Berger,
Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform Death
Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1666 (1990) (stating that some regard
federal habeas corpus as a "slap in the face of federalism").
32. Hoffmann, supra note 31, at 134; see also AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., COMM. REPORT AND PROPOSAL
[1989] 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989) (charging that the present system
of habeas corpus "has led to piecemeal and repetitious litigation, and years of delay").
33. See generally Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure
for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1993). So intense is this debate that
Chief Justice Rehnquist formed the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in
Capital Cases headed by Retired Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell. Id. at 1048. The re-
port from this Committee, commonly known as the Powell Committee Report, is a fore-
runner of S. 1441. See generally Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
941, 1065 n.680 (1991).
34. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 24, § 33.01(b); WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.2(e) (2d ed. 1992).
35. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 34, § 28.2(e)-(f) (discussing the ar-
guments for expanding and restricting federal habeas corpus and the manifestations of
these arguments in case law).
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curtailing the availability of federal habeas corpus36 and Supreme
Court decisions impose a myriad of procedural obstacles on the
exercise of the Great Writ.37
B.. The State Criminal Justice System
Any restriction on the right of habeas corpus is most alarming
when one realizes the unreliability of the alternatives: the state
criminal justice system and executive clemency. As of 1982, feder-
al courts granted relief for constitutional error in sixty to seventy-
five percent of capital cases in habeas.38 As of 1983, the rate was
seventy percent, and by 1986 the rate was sixty percent.39 The
rate of reversal in capital cases has decreased in recent years due
to at least two factors: the law has begun to settle and the proce-
dural barriers to habeas review generated by the Supreme Court
have restricted appeals.' These statistics underscore the need for
liberalized federal review of capital cases to ensure justice.
Another pitfall of. state criminal justice systems is the time
limit imposed on motions for a new trial after a guilty verdict. In
thirteen out of the thirty-seven states with the death penalty, a
motion based on new evidence of innocence must be presented
within sixty days of the verdict.4' Mississippi even requires that a
36. See, e.g., S. 1441 and S. 1657 (placing a "statute of limitations" on habeas corpus
appeals). See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
37. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, ,Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme
Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68
IND. L.J. 817, 819 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court has responded to the growth of
habeas cases with procedural restrictions); Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending
Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of
Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 451, 460 (1990-1991) (noting the Supreme Court's "relentless creation of proce-
dural barriers to federal review of constitutional claims"). See also Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating in reference to the Court's
habeas corpus rules that they are "a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and un-
justifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights").
38. Mello & Duffy, supra note 37, at 459-60.
39. Id. The rate of reversal in non-capital habeas cases was only 0.25% to 7.0% as of
1983. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The low rate
of reversals in non-capital cases is most likely because, on the average, more qualified
attorneys are supplied for capital appeals. Regardless of that fact, there is still a great
need for better representation in capital appeals. See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying
text.
40. Mello & Duffy, supra note 37, at 460.
41. See ALA. CODE § 15-17-5 (1982) (30 days); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 24.2(a) (60 days);
ARK. R. CRmI. P. 36.22 (30 days); FLA. STAT. ANN. R. CRIM. P. 3-590 (West 1992) (10
days; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, 1 5/116-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (30 days); IND. R. CRIM. P.
16 (30 days); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 29.11(b) (15-25 days); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-702(2)
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motion for new trial be made during the term in which judgment
was announced. 2 In light of Herrera, death row inmates in these
thirteen states are effectively precluded from ever presenting new
evidence of innocence since any evidence of innocence most often
arises well beyond sixty days after trial. 3 One strains to see the
logic of even having these time limits since they basically operate
as a total bar to new evidence petitions.
C. Executive Clemency
The other vehicle whereby capital defendants can try to
achieve justice for claims of innocence is executive clemency.
However, any hope that innocents will be protected through execu-
tive clemency is even more dim than the hope that they will be
protected through state criminal justice systems. As executions have
increased over recent years, the exercise of clemency has de-
creased.' The facts illustrate that governors rarely use their clem-
ency powers for fear of appearing soft on crime.45 One author
concluded that "[flor all practical purposes [clemency] is no longer
(1993) (30 days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-29-1 (1988) (10 days); TENN. R.
CRIM. P. 33(b) (30 days); Tx. R. App. P. 31(a)(l) (30 days); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24(c)
(10 days); VA. S. CT. R. 3A:15(b) (21 days). While the Texas rule of appellate procedure
limits motions for new evidence to within 30 days of trial, it should technically not be
numbered with the above listed states due to the recent ruling in State ex. rel. Holmes v.
3d Court of Appeals, No. 71,764, 1994 WL 135476 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1994)
which overruled Texas's 30-day limit.
42. MISS. CIR. CT. CRIM. R. 5.16 (providing that the motion must be filed during term
in which judgment is rendered, except on an order from the court to permit filing during
a later term).
43. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
44. Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment,
99 YALE L.J. 389, 393-94 n.25 (1989) (presenting statistics showing the simultaneous
increase in executions and decrease in commutations).
45. See id.; Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning
Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 608 (1991); Don't Make It Easier to Exe-
cute the hnocent, supra note 9, at 10A. Perhaps the best example of executives fearing a
public image of being "soft on crime" is President Bill Clinton's behavior while governor
of Arkansas. During his first term as governor, he commuted several death sentences.
Cobb, supra note 44, at 394 n.26. After defeat in his re-election bid, Clinton ran again
promising "'not to commute so many sentences if . . . given another chance."' Id. For
further examples of governors who have shied away from their clemency powers for
political reasons and for examples of governors who have been politically punished for
exertion of their clemency powers, see id. at 393-95. See also Hugo Adam Bedau, Tile
Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
255, 270 (1990-1991) (stating that governors usually only commute death sentences after
further political aspirations have ceased and providing examples).
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available from the executive branch. 4 6 This is ironic when one
considers Chief Justice Rehnquist's assurances in Herrera that
clemency is the vehicle that prevents the erroneous execution of
death row inmates.47 On the contrary, the trend in clemency indi-
cates that executives are increasingly ignoring clemency pleas.48
Since both the executive and judicial branches are abdicating their
roles as protectors of justice, Congress has had to intervene with
the new evidence provisions in Senate Bill 1441." 9
Im. THE HERRERA DECISION
The Herrera decision was a habeas corpus appeal from Texas.
A death row inmate, Leonel Herrera, claimed actual innocence
based on newly discovered evidence." This new evidence, first
presented eight years after trial, essentially alleged that Herrera's
dead brother, Raul, had killed the two police officers Herrera was
convicted of murdering." Four affidavits were offered to prove
Raul had committed the murders. Three affidavits-from Raul's
attorney, cellmate, and schoolmate-all contained testimony that
Raul had confessed the killings to the affiants 2 The fourth affida-
vit was from Raul's son who testified that he witnessed his father's
slaying of the police officers and that the petitioner had not even
been present. 3 At trial, Herrera had been convicted based on a
46. Cobb, supra note 44, at 395.
47. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868 (1993).
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49. It is interesting to note that when Justice Ginsburg was questioned in her Senate
confirmation hearings on her opinion of Herrera, she told the Senate that what happens
next to the issue of innocence claims based on new evidence is a question as to the
balance between justice and finality that is Congress's call-not the Court's. Nomination
of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 103d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 294-95 (1993).
50. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 856.
51. Id. at 858. Essentially, it is alleged in the affidavits that Raul was part of a drug
trafficking scheme with the Hidalgo County Sheriff and kept silent about his slaying of
the officers because he thought his brother would be acquitted. Id. at 858 n.2. After his
brother was found guilty, Raul began blackmailing the sheriff. Id. It is further alleged that
Raul was killed by one of the sheriff's cronies in the drug trafficking scheme to silence
him. Id.
52. Id. at 858. Raul's attorney, Hector Villarreal, gave his affidavit on December 11,
1990. Id. at 858 n.2. Raul's cellmate, Juan Franco Palacious, gave his affidavit on De-
cember 10, 1990. Id. Raul's and Leonel's schoolmate, Jose Ybarra, Jr., gave his affidavit
on January 9, 1991. Id. at 858 n.3.
53. Id. at 858. Raul Jr.'s affidavit was dated January 29, 1992. Id. at 859 n.3. Raul Jr.
was nine years old at the time of the murders. Id. at 858.
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self-incriminating letter and an assortment of circumstantial evi-
dence.54
The district court granted Herrera an evidentiary hearing to
present his new evidence of innocence."5 The ruling was made by
Judge Ricardo Hinojosa, a Reagan appointee not characterized as
soft on crime, who decided Herrera should have a chance to pres-
ent his new evidence out of a "'sense of fairness and due pro-
cess. '"'56 The Fifth Circuit vacated the stay of execution, holding
that a claim of actual innocence, by itself, is not a constitutional
claim. 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari but did not grant
Herrera a stay of execution to hear his appeal.58 Without the inter-
vention of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Herrera would
have been executed before the Supreme Court even heard his claim
of innocence. 9 The Supreme Court affirmed the holding by the
Fifth Circuit in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.'
The thrust of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was that the
Supreme Court has never understood actual innocence based only
on newly discovered evidence to be a constitutional claim.6 ' Ac-
54. Id. at 857. A handwritten letter which Herrera had at the time of his arrest implied
he had killed the first police officer, David Rucker. Id. The circumstantial evidence in-
cluded the identification of Herrera by the second police officer, Enrique Carrisalez, before
his death and the identification of Herrera by a police officer who witnessed Carrisalez's
slaying. Id. The car identified as the one from which the shots were fired belonged to
Herrera's girlfriend, and strands of Rucker's hair were found in it. Id. Also Herrera's So-
cial Security card was found alongside Rucker's car, and blood splatters, the same as
Rucker's blood type, were on Herrera's jeans and wallet. Id.
55. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 859 (1993). Herrera could not bring his claim
in state court due to Texas's rule requiring that new evidence of innocence be presented
within 30 days of trial. TEx. R. APP. P. ANN. 31(a)(l) (West 1992). That law has since
been overruled. State ex rel. Holmes v. 3d Court of Appeals, No. 71,764, 1994 WL
135476 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1994).
56. Hentoff, supra note 8, at A31.
57. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
58. Herrera v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992) (denying application for stay of execu-
tion presented to Justice Scalia). Only four votes are needed to grant certiorari; five votes
are needed to stay an execution. Ex parte Herrera, 828 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992). Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter would vote to grant the stay.
Herrera, 112 S. Ct. at 1074.
59. See Ex parte Herrera, 828 S.W.2d at 9 (holding that it would be improper for the
execution to be carried out before the petition for writ of certiorari is reviewed by the
Supreme Court). In fact, in Hamilton v. Texas, 497 U.S. 1016, 1017 (1990), the Supreme
Court voted to review a capital case but did not grant a stay, and the petitioner was
executed before the Court could hear the case.
60. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 856.
61. Id. at 860 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
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cording to the Rehnquist opinion, interests of finality in adjudica-
tion and the fact that Herrera is now presumed guilty must pre-
dominate.62 "Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal
system than to provide for federal habeas review of free-standing
claims of actual innocence."'63 The Court refused to hold that
Texas's law, requiring that a motion for new trial be made within
thirty days of conviction,' violated either the Eighth Amendment
or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses.65  The
Rehnquist opinion pointed to the "fail-safe" of clemency as the
best alternative for capital defendants with strong claims of inno-
cence.
66
In a curious discussion, the Rehnquist opinion then assumed
"for the sake of argument" that the Constitution does encompass
claims of innocence such as Herrera's.67 In that event, the state's
interests of finality and manageability of court dockets would re-
quire an "extraordinarily high" showing of innocence to obtain
habeas relief.68 Herrera would not meet that standard based on his.
"disfavored" use of affidavits, 69 the inconsistencies within the affi-
davits, and the weight of the evidence presented against Herrera at
trial.70
Despite the Rehnquist opinion, six justices expressed through
concurrences and dissents a willingness to allow claims of actual
innocence into habeas corpus.7 However, the justices varied wide-
ly on what should be the proper standard for such a claim. More-
over, the majority opinion's "extraordinarily high" standard presents
a Court predisposed to disallow hearings for actual innocence based
on new evidence.72
62. Id. at 861.
63. Id.
64. TEx. R. APP. P. ANN. 31(a)(1) (West 1992).
65. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 866.
66. Id. at 868.
67. Id. at 869.
68. Id.
69. The use of affidavits is called "disfavored" in the Rehnquist opinion because the
statements are not subject to cross-examination, and there is no opportunity to judge the
affiants' credibility. Id.
70. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869-70 (1993). The inconsistencies within the
affidavits included discrepancies as to how many were in the vehicle from which the
shots were fired, in which direction the car was heading, Herrera's whereabouts on the
night of the murders, and when the murders occurred. Id. at 870. The Court also empha-
sized that the affidavits were filed at the "eleventh hour." Id. at 869.
71. Id. at 870 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); id. at 875 (White, J., concur-
ring); id. at 876 (Blackmun, Stevens, & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
72. See Thomas J. Sullivan, A Practical Guide to Recent Developments in Federal
19951
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Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy,
stated that "the execution of a legally and factually innocent person
would be a constitutionally intolerable event."73 Justice O'Connor
refused, however, to answer the question of whether a fairly con-
victed person is entitled to another hearing to adjudicate his
guilt.7 4 In fact, she believed that such a question may never have
to be addressed by the Court given the safeguards of clemency.75
The concurrence emphasized Herrera's overwhelming guilt based
on all the evidence and concluded that whatever the standard for
obtaining further review would be, Herrera would not meet it.
76
Justice White, who concurred only in the judgment, assumed
that executing an innocent person is unconstitutional.77 He enunci-
ated a standard whereby a convicted defendant could receive re-
view of new evidence.7" That standard would require that, after
the new evidence is considered, "'no rational trier of fact could
[find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 79 Justice White
concluded Herrera did not meet that standard. 0
Justice Scalia's concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas, bluntly
stated that "[t]here is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contem-
porary practice (if that were enough), for finding in the Constitu-
tion a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered
evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction."'" Justice
Scalia's determination rested on dictum in Townsend v. Sain 2 and
his concern for the burden that would be imposed on lower federal
courts to analyze new evidence of innocence claims on a regular
basis."
Habeas Corpus for Practicing Attorneys, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 337-38 (1993) (finding
that the Court would only review actual innocence claims in an "extraordinary factual
circumstance").
73. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 870-71 (stating that normally a fairly convicted person is not entitled to an-
other hearing to adjudicate his guilt, but that this claim is disturbing).
75. Id. at 874.
76. See id. at 871-73 (finding that the affidavits pale when compared to the proof at
trial).
77. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
78. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 875 (1993).
79. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963). This dictum is the statement from Townsend that "new-
ly discovered evidence relevant only to a state prisoner's guilt or innocence is not a basis
for federal habeas corpus relief." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 875 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). But note
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Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and
Souter, was an unusually harsh criticism of the majority's conclu-
sion. The dissent concluded that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments forbid "the execution of a person who has been validly
convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his inno-
cence with newly discovered evidence."'  Clemency was rejected
by the dissent as an "act of grace" insufficient to satisfy a capital
defendant's constitutional claims." According to the dissent, the
petitioner should have the burden of proving that, based on all of
the new and old evidence, he is "probably innocent."86 As for
Herrera's situation, the dissent would have remanded to the district
court for a decision on Herrera's claim since district courts are the
proper forum for evaluation of evidence.87
The last portion of the dissent88 contained perhaps the most
strident protest to the majority decision. Justice Blackmun disap-
proved of the Court's continued refusal to restrict the states' power
to execute and its abandonment of its duty to safeguard justice.89
He concluded with a stinging remark on the effect of the
majority's holding: "The execution of a person who can show that
he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder."'
that the much belabored burden on federal courts as a result of habeas petitions is only
around 5% of all civil actions filed in federal court. Lay, supra note 33, at 1044 n.162.
84. Herrera, 113 S. Ct at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 881.
86. Id. at 882-83.
87. Id. at 884. The dissent also faults the majority for dismissing Herrera's evidence
because it came from affidavits. Id. (stating that since Herrera has not been allowed a
hearing, affidavits are the only means whereby he could present any evidence at this
stage of appeal).
88. See id. at 876 (explaining that Justices Stevens and Souter did not join this por-
tion).
89. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 884 (1993)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90. Id. Leonel Herrera was executed on May 12, 1993, by lethal injection. Herrera
Executed in Texas, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEws DIGEST, May 13, 1993, at 350, BI. It
is worth noting that Justice Blackmun's years on the Court and his experience with capi-
tal appeals have caused him to take the position that "the death penalty, as currently ad-
ministered, is unconstitutional." Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited Herrera as one of the cases demonstrat-
ing the Court's inability to constitutionally enforce the death penalty. Id. at 1137. In
reference to Herrera, he stated:
Certainly there will be individuals who are actually innocent who will be un-
able to make a better showing than what was made by Herrera without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The Court is unmoved by this dilemma, how-
ever, it prefers "finality" in death sentences to reliable determinations of a capi-
tal defendant's guilt.
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What is the message from Herrera? There are two major
interpretations. First, the decision could be narrowly interpreted and
limited to the specific facts of the Herrera case.9 Since Herrera's
claim was so weak, this issue was not really addressed. After all,
six justices agreed that no matter what the standard for obtaining
relief was, Herrera could never meet it.92 Thus one could take an
optimistic viewpoint that since six justices seemed to say the Con-
stitution prohibits execution of innocents,93 the door is not closed
to a future case allowing for review of capital defendants' inno-
cence claims.94 However, that does not seem to be likely in the
immediate future. In granting review of a case to be heard in the
fall of 1994 where the defendant is claiming new evidence of inno-
cence, the Court refused to certify for review the issue of actual
innocence as a free-standing constitutional claim.95
A second viewpoint, one seized by newspapers across the
country" and by Justice Blackmun,97 is the broad interpretation
Id. at 1138 (footnote omitted).
91. See Hoffmann, supra note 37, at 832 (finding that the Court interpreted on pri-
marily procedural, rather than substantive grounds); Constitutional Law Conference, 62
U.S.L.W. 2263, 2269-70 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1993) (quoting Yale Kamisar's analysis).
92. See generally Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 856-75 (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, White, Scalia, and Thomas).
93. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, White,
Blackmun, Stevens and Souter).
94. Hoffmann, supra note 37, at 833.
95. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1368
(1994); Schlup v. Delo, 63 U.S.L.W. 3025, 3025 (U.S. July 19, 1994) (setting out the
questions presented for Court review); Michael Kirkland, Supreme Court Accepts Evidence
Issue on Capital Case, PROPRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS 1994, Mar. 28, 1994 (noting
that the Court refused to certify the question of whether execution of an actually innocent
person violates the Constitution). In refusing to answer the question of whether executing
an actually innocent person is a constitutional violation, the Court instead will be address-
ing the evidentiary standard needed for proof of innocence in a "miscarraige of justice"
claim in which evidence of actual innocence is the gateway to raise a procedurally de-
faulted claim. Schup, 63 U.S.L.W. at 3025. This is in contrast to the free-standing claim
of innocence raised in Herrera. In Schlup, the Court will be choosing between the stan-
dard announced in Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992), of clear and con-
vincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would find
the defendant guilty and the standard announced in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,
454 (1986) of a colorable showing of innocence. Id. Thus, although the contexts vary, the
Court's decision in Schlup is relevant to this Note's discussion of evidentiary standards.
Indeed, the Schlup decision will go a long way towards predicting future action, if any,
by the Court on the evidentiary standard for free-standing claims of actual innocence. For
the factual background surrounding the Schiup case, see infra note 126 and accompanying
text.
96. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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that the Court has shirked its duty as protector of the Constitution.
This viewpoint stresses that executing an innocent person should be
the most unconstitutional action a state could perform. The Court's
reference to an "extraordinarily high" standard98 indicates that no
case will likely ever merit a hearing for new evidence. Justice
Blackmun believes that Herrera "erect[ed] nearly insurmountable
barriers to a defendant's ability to get a hearing on a claim of
actual innocence."" By deferring to clemency and refusing to
structure a standard by which a hearing can be obtained, the Court
demonstrated its eagerness to further limit habeas corpus at the
expense of certainty. Indeed the Court's foremost aim seemed to be
to increase the pace of executions." ° The Court's refusal to stay
Herrera's execution until his case had been heard is a strong indi-
cator of the Court's utter intolerance for capital appeals.'
IV. APPLICATIONS OF HERRERA
Based on subsequent cases applying Herrera, the immediate
effect of the Herrera opinion has been to facilitate executions.
Herrera has yet to be viewed in its narrow context by lower feder-
al courts. It has turned into the "green light to execute innocent
people" that the director of the American Civil Liberties Union's
capital punishment project feared it would be.' 2
In Delo v. Blair,°3 the Supreme Court summarily rejected a
capital defendant's new evidence claim, saying that the claim was
indistinguishable from Herrera's. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
dissented, urging the Court not to vacate the stay of execution
ordered by the Court of Appeals." Based on the Court of
Appeals' concurring opinion,' 5 Blair's claim of innocence and
98. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993).
99. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Cf. J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Feder-
alism; the Burden for Defense Counsel; and the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L. REV.
291, 326 (1992) (predicting that the result of Herrera will be facilitation of executions).
101. Cf. id. at 325 (noting that Herrera suggests the Court's willingness to subjugate
the federal claim to the state's interest in execution).
102. New Facts Won't Automatically Halt Execution, STAR TRIB., Jan. 26, 1993, at IA,
4A (quoting Diann'Rust-Tiemey, director of the American Civil Liberties Union's capital
punishment project).
103. 113 S. Ct. 2922, 2923 (1993).
104. Id. (Blackmun & Stevens, J.J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not join in the dis-
sent, but he also refused to vacate the stay. Id. at 2924.
105. Blair v. Delo, 999 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., concurring), stay vacated, 113
S. Ct. 2922 (1993). Justice Heaney systematically eliminated the errors the Supreme Court
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injustice seemed more substantial than Herrera's but was neverthe-
less summarily rejected under Herrera. As a result of another
state's time limit for raising claims of new evidence, yet another
death row inmate with cognizable claims of innocence was execut-
ed without an evidentiary hearing to examine those claims."° The
Supreme Court again showed no tolerance for claims of actual
innocence.
This intolerance was seized by the district court in Young v.
Puckett, °7 which held that free-standing claims of innocence are
not permitted in habeas corpus and thus rejected the capital
defendant's claim of innocence. Also, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Bolder v. Delo,05 followed Herrera's disfavored view
of affidavits and dismissed a claim of actual innocence in a capital
case due to the "eleventh hour" appearance of the affidavits and
the double hearsay found within them. The Eighth Circuit reiterated
its impatience with innocence claims by death row inmates in
Schlup v. Delo'" where it rejected the innocence claims of a
death row inmate who later received a commutation due to strong
evidence of innocence. The court cited Herrera and stated that
"[f]ederal habeas . . . does not provide a forum for the retrial of a
convicted felon.""' In addition to these cases, there have been
found in Herrera's affidavits from Blair's affidavits. Blair had a stronger claim of inno-
cence because 1) his affidavits did not contain hearsay since five affiants testified that the
real killer confessed to them, therefore falling under the hearsay exception for admissions,
2) there was a satisfactory explanation for the delay which caused one witness to recant
her trial testimony since she feared for her life at the hands of the confessed killer, and
3) there were no inconsistencies within Blair's affidavits. Id. at 1221. In addition to be-
lieving in Blair's innocence, Heaney also believed that he did not receive a fair trial pri-
marily due to prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 1220.
106. Blair was executed 90 minutes after the Supreme Court lifted the Court of
Appeals' stay. No More Hearings for Walter Blair, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 23,
1993, at 6B.
107. 822 F. Supp. 352, 355 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
108. 985 F.2d 941, 943 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1070 (1993). The court
noted Justice O'Connor's statement that eleventh hour affidavits "'are to be treated with a
fair degree of skepticism."' Id. (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 872 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). The new evidence alleged in the affidavits was that the vic-
tim died as a result of medical malpractice and not the stab wound inflicted by the capi-
tal defendant. Id. at 942.
109. 11 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994). See infra note
126 and accompanying text for details of Schlup's evidence of innocence and the commu-
tation he received.
110. Schlup, 11 F.3d at 741. As in Bolder, the Eight Circuit also focused on the "in-
consistencies and weaknesses" in Schlup's affidavits. Id. at 744. Note that this case will
be reviewed by the Supreme Court in the fall of 1994 but not on the issue of actual
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several other opinions utilizing the Herrera precedent to deny new
evidence of actual innocence claims."'
Thus far, Herrera's progeny, with few exceptions,"' have
reflected a wholesale affirmation of Chief Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion holding that a claim of innocence based on new
evidence is not a constitutional issue. The Herrera decision is a
major contributing ingredient to the current "rush to execution"
mindset affecting the country as exemplified by the judiciary's
eagerness to hurry the process of justice."' This mindset has pro-
duced an increase in executions in recent years and an indication
that the trend will continue in greater numbers."4 In Delo v.
innocence as a free-standing claim. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
111. See Murray v. Delo, No. 91-2542EM, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24121, at *18-19
(8th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994) (dismissing new evidence couched in affidavits based on
Herrera); Jacobs v. Scott, No. 93-2792, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 23922, at *15-17 (5th
Cir. Sept. 1, 1994) (choosing not to engage in the arguendo of Herrera and to instead
follow the rule that actual innocence claims based on new evidence are not constitutional
claims); Bryant v. Scott, 28 F.3d 1141, 1420 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting Bryant's
claim that the district court erred in finding that his claim of actual innocence provided
no basis for relief); Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406, 1410 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Herrera for proposition that new evidence of actual innocence claims is not cognizable in
habeas corpus); United States ex. rel. Pearson v. Ahitow, No. 93-CV-3303, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11154, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1994) (rejecting new evidence claim as con-
stitutionally irrelevant); Bowman v. Armontrout, No. 90-0969-CV-W-8, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11214, at *4 (W.D. Mo. July 14, 1994) (holding that new evidence cannot be
presented which relates to guilt or innocence); Payne v. Thompson, 853 F. Supp. 932,
937 (E.D. Va. 1994) (dismissing new evidence of innocence since actual innocence is not
a constitutional claim); United States v. DeCarlo, 848 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that under Herrera the conviction of an innocent person is an unconstitutional
injustice only when a legal error accompanies it).
112. See Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 1994) (interpreting Herrera to
hold unconstitutional the execution of a '"legally and factually innocent person'); Enoch
v. Gramley, No. 93-1003, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12250, at *28 (C.D. II1. Aug. 22, 1994)
(citing Herrera for the proposition that a habeas petitioner can obtain relief for new evi-
dence of actual innocence when proof of probable innocence is made).
113. See John B. Morris, Jr., Note, The Rush to Execution: Successive Habeas Corpus
Petitions in Capital Cases, 95 YALE L.J. 371, 377 (1985) (noting that recent Supreme
Court opinions display the justices' impatience with the habeas corpus process).
114. See Naftali Bendavid, What Ever Happened to Habeas Reform?, LEGAL TMES,
May 16, 1994, at 1, 17 (detailing the increase in executions by 24 from 1991 to 1993
and stating that more states are expected to join the ranks of the 37 states with capital
punishment); Welsh S. White, Capital Punishment's Future, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1429,
1439-40 (1993) (presenting statistics that from 1987-1992 executions averaged 18 per year
nationwide, but the pace increased to 31 executions in 1992. Moreover, White argues that
the current political climate will hasten this trend to at least 50 executions per year by
the mid-1990s); Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment in the 1990's, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 7 (1992) (predicting, based on the
trend of the Supreme Court, that the coming decade will see an increase in executions).
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Blair, justice would have been better served by allowing Blair to
present his new evidence in court. Instead, Blair was summarily
denied that opportunity and executed ninety minutes later amid a
cloud of doubt."5 Why the rush?
V. INNOCENTS ARE EXECUTED
The fear that innocents may be executed is not unrealistic.
Factually innocent defendants have been executed in the United
States, and the risk still exists. Even well-known proponents of
capital punishment concede that innocents are executed." 6 The
most comprehensive proof of this comes from the Bedau and
Radelet study."7 This research surveyed capital punishment from
1900 and unearthed 416 "potentially capital cases" in which defen-
dants convicted of capital crimes have been shown innocent."8 At
least twenty-three were ultimately executed."9
A widespread public misconception exists that innocents are
not executed or at least that the danger is a relic of history.1
20
115. See supra note 106.
116. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice, 23 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 59, 114 (1989) (saying that there is no serious doubt that capital punishment results
in innocents being executed). Ernest van den Haag, a leading proponent of -the death
penalty, sees the executions of innocents as a justifiable cost of the death penalty since
"[m]ost human activities ... cause the death of some innocent bystanders." ERNEST VAN
DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 226 (1983). Van den
Haag views the moral advantages of the death penalty as outweighing its moral disadvan-
tages. Id. Also Justice Blackmun, though not a capital punishment proponent, has recently
stated that he believes innocent men are being executed in the United States. Callins v.
Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 n.8 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992) [hereinafter IN SPITE
OF INNOCENCE]; Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) [hereinafter Bedau & Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice]. But see Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the
Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 121 (1988)
(presenting the argument that the Bedau-Radelet study is "severely flawed" and only con-
firms that the risk of executing the innocent is too minuscule a factor to be considered in
the death penalty debate). Bedau and Radelet subsequently responded to Markman and
Cassell's criticism leveled at their study. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Tile
Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988)
[hereinafter Bedau & Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility].
118. IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, supra note 117, at 17, 272.
119. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117, at 36. Several others
were saved with only moments to spare. Id. at 71.
120. Robert R. Bryan, The Execution of the Innocent, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 831, 831-32 (1990-1991). See also Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death
Penalty, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993, at 33 (recounting his testimony before Congress that
no innocent person had been executed in the past 50 years).
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Such a belief should be questioned in light of the recent epidemic
of innocents released from death row.' The staff of the Civil
Rights Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee has found
forty-eight cases of innocent men released from death row in the
past twenty years alone. 12 In 1987, 1988, and 1989, at least
twelve men on death row were released as innocent.12 1
Recently, there have been several haunting tales of men within
days and even hours of execution who were released due to their
innocence. In 1992, Walter McMillian was released from an Ala-
bama penitentary after serving six years for a murder he did not
commit. McMillian's fifth state appeal was finally successful in
proving that he had been convicted based on false testimony and
racial prejudice. 24 Kirk Bloodsworth was freed in 1993, after
eight years on Maryland's death row, due to a new DNA testing
procedure which established his innocence." Lloyd Schlup came
within eight hours of execution in 1993 before his sentence was
commuted by the governor of Missouri due to substantial questions
of Schlup's guilt.
26
In addition to these avoidances of the death penalty, there are
several capital defendants currently asserting colorable innocence
claims. In the celebrated case of Gary Graham, a Texas death row
inmate is claiming his innocence while making dramatic challenges
to Texas law and the Herrera precedent. Graham was convict-
121. See Marcia Coyle, Innocence vs. Executions, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1, 33
(noting the increasing number of inmates being released from death row as innocents).
122. William E. Clayton, Jr., Dangers Seen in Death Row Appeals Rules, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 22, 1993, at 18A.
123. Tabak & Lane, supra note 116, at 102.
124. Christopher Colford, Cruel, But Not Unusual, Mistakes, THE PLAtN DEALER, Mar.
7, 1993, at 3-C. Note that if McMillian had been sentenced to life imprisonment, he
probably would have died in jail since he only received special legal assistance from the
Alabama Capital Representation Project because of his death sentence. Coyle, supra note
121, at 33.
125. Innocent, but Sentenced to Die, WASH. POST, July 3, 1993, at A22.
126. The Ultimate Crank Call, TIE, Nov. 29, 1993, at 20, 20. After a two day trial,
Schlup was sentenced to die for killing a prison guard, but a videotape gives him an
alibi, and five eyewitnesses who did not testify at trial attest that Schlup was not the as-
sailant. Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 1993) (Heaney, Sr. J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1368 (1994). A prison guard also asserted Schlup's innocence.
James Willwerth, Invitation to an Execution, TIME, Nov. 22, 1993, at 46, 46. However,
Schlup's habeas appeals based on new evidence were unsuccessful as a result of Herrera.
See Schlup, 11 F.3d at 741 (noting that federal habeas corpus does not permit the retrial
of a convicted felon). Despite the commutation, Schlup will try to prove his innocence to
the Supreme Court during its October 1994 term. See supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
127. Kathy Fair, Many States Have Limits on Evidence; Texas Is Not Alone on Its 30-
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ed of murder without any physical evidence primarily due to the
testimony of one witness who was forty feet away.128 Eleven wit-
nesses have since asserted Graham's innocence but have been
barred from testifying because of the thirty-day time limit in Texas
of which Herrera was also a victim."9 On three separate occa-
sions Graham has come within days, and even hours, of death.3'
A Texas civil court ordered that Graham be granted a clemency
hearing based on assertions in Herrera that clemency is a "fail-
safe."13' Another Texas death row inmate, Robert Drew, asserted
his claim of innocence in conjunction with Gary Graham in the
Texas civil court. 32 Drew's assertion of innocence stemmed from
his accomplice recanting testimony that Drew performed the mur-
der."'33 The civil court order granting both men's clemency hear-
ings was appealed to the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals, which
unexpectedly overruled Texas's thirty-day limitation on new evi-
dence claims (something the Supreme Court refused to do in
Herrera). In place of the thirty-day rule, the court announced a
standard for presenting new evidence of innocence which places a
high burden of proof on the defendant."M That decision is now
on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. However, Robert Drew has
since been executed, despite his claims of innocence.'35
Two other colorable innocence claims are being made in Cali-
fornia and Virginia. In California, Willie Darnell Johnson has re-
ceived a stay of execution in order for his claim of innocence to
Day Rule, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 17, 1993, at Al.
128. Foes of Execution Contest a Texas Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at A16.
129. Id.
130. See Susan Warren and Glen Golightly, Graham Wins 3rd Reprieve from Death;
Clemency Hearing Is at Issue, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 14, 1993, at I (reporting
Graham's third reprieve in four months).
131. State ex rel. Holmes v. 3d Court of Appeals of Texas, 860 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993) (en banc); Marcia Coyle, Innmate Granted Unique Hearing, NAT'L L. J.,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 3, 42.
132. Rad Sallee, Justices Refuse Case of 'Smiling' Death Warrant, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 1, 1994, at 16A. Drew's petition for Supreme Court review was denied. Drew v.
Collins, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1207 (1994). Drew attempted to raise an Eighth Amend-
ment claim since the judge who signed the order setting his execution date put a "happy
face" by his signature. Sallee, supra, at 16A.
133. Sallee, supra note 132, at 16A.
134. State ex rel. Holmes, No. 71,764, 1994 WL 135476, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr.
20, 1994); Gary Taylor, Texas Death Row Inmate Wins, But Faces Tough Test, NAT'L L.
J., May 16, 1994, at A9.
135. Texas Executes Vermont Man in Slaying During Hitchhiking, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
1994 at A19.
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be evaluated.'36 Earl Washington, Jr., a capital defendant in Vir-
ginia, is avowing his innocence through a new DNA test which,
based on the facts of the state's case, makes it impossible for
Washington to have committed both the rape and murder for which
he was convicted.' Washington has received a conditional par-
don of life imprisionment from the Virginia governor due to his
innocence claims. 38 However, as a result of this conditional par-
don, Washington will not be able to prove his innocence in
court.'39 These are just a few of the cases which demonstrate
that, overall, the number of innocence claims is rising dramatical-
ly.1
40
These cases of innocence and asserted innocence are poignant
in light of the belief that the risk of executing innocent men has
disappeared.' 4' That these innocent men came so close to execu-
tion indicates the tightrope on which the American justice system
is walking. Instead of indicating that the system works, these cases
136. Harriet Chiang, New Evidence May Spare Man on Death Row, S.F. CHRON., July
17, 1993, at A16.
137. Coyle, supra note 121, at 33. In order to deflect this new evidence, the state
would have to now change its version of the facts of the case and allege that the victim
had intercourse with someone other than her husband or Washington, despite the state-
ments of the victim to the contrary before her death. See id. Moreover, Washington is
mentally retarded and confessed to the rape and murder after two days of interrogation in
which he gave a confession with details that were totally inconsistent with the crime. Id.
See also William Raspberry, Scientific Evidence Supersedes Politics to Grant a Pardon,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1994, 1, at 15.
138. Peter Baker, Death Row Inmate Gets Clemency; Agreement Ends Day of Suspense,
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1994, at Al.
139. See id. at A12 (noting that Washington was only given two hours by Governor
Wilder to choose between 1) taking the pardon (which subjected him to life in prison)
and thereby giving up any federal habeas petition based on innocence, or 2) refusing the
pardon and taking the risk that his execution would be upheld).
140. See Coyle, supra note 121, at 33 (stating that there are three principal reasons for
this increase: the number of death row inmates is increasing, death penalty resource cen-
ters are channelling more resources into factual investigations, and scientific techniques
such as DNA testing have opened up new avenues of proving innocence). See also Mark
Ballard, Innocence Claims Hinge on Herrera; Texas Case May Limit Death Row's Best
Defense, TEXAS LAW., Jan. 18, 1993, at 1, 25 (reporting that an informal survey of six
states with the death penalty reveals that nearly 50 inmates have claimed innocence in
recent habeas petitions). Cf Peter J. Neufeld, Have You No Sense of Decency?, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189, 201-02 (1993) (arguing against laws which limit the pro-
duction of new evidence to within 60 days of trial due to the potentially exculpatory
power of DNA testing). Another reason for the increase is that capital punishment oppo-
nents see innocence claims as the "Achilles' heel of the death penalty in America" and
are spotlighting these cases. Coyle, supra note 121, at 33.
141. See Bryan, supra note 120, at 831-32 (noting the misconception among Americans
that innocent people are no longer executed in the United States).
19951
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
indicate the system is fallible. While no one can conclusively point
to an innocent who has been executed in recent years, there are
certainly strong cases to make. 142 The large number of released
innocents strengthens the likelihood that some innocents have fallen
through the cracks. Bedau estimated in 1992 that one percent of
the 2600 people on death row were innocent.
43
The reality that the United States has executed innocent men
in the past and is likely executing innocent men in the present
gives credence to the cries made after Herrera of "state mur-
der"' and "[m]urder by the highest court in the land."' 45 It is
this reality which makes Senate Bill 1441's provisions for federal
habeas corpus appeals based on claims of new evidence of inno-
cence anything but an academic question. The standards for new
evidence in Senate Bill 1441 will have a direct impact on human
lives and the credibility of the American justice system and thus
must adequately ensure that justice will be served.
VI. EXAMINATION OF THE NEW EVIDENCE PROVISION IN
SENATE BILL 1441
Congress has responded to the protests following the Herrera
decision141 with a provision in the Habeas Corpus Reform Act
which gives constitutional review to claims of innocence based on
newly discovered evidence. 47 The Habeas Corpus Reform Act, or
the "Biden Bill," originally was one of the three major prongs of
President Bill Clinton's crime package.148 The habeas provisions,
142. A strong case has already been made for Walter Blair. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text. There is also the case of Roger Keith Coleman who was executed in
Virginia despite his claims of actual innocence. Coleman's claims were broadcast through
an intense media campaign which included a cover story in TIME. See Jill Smolowe, Must
This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40; Guilty or Innocent, He's Dead, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, May 21, 1992, at IA.
143. Stuart Taylor, Jr., When Quick Justice Is No Justice at All. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2,
1992, at 25, 25.
144. Harrington, supra note 7, at A25.
145. Hentoff, supra note 8, at A31.
146. Texas has also responded by eliminating its 30 day period for new evidence in ex-
change for a standard for presenting new evidence which is very similar to Senate Bill
1441 but even more difficult to meet. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
147. S. 1441, § 6. This provision provides for review of two types of innocence claims:
that the petitioner is innocent of the underlying crime itself, and that the petitioner is
"death-innocent" or undeserving of capital punishment due to some error in the capital
sentencing phase. Id.
148. The other two provisions were the Brady Bill, a five-day waiting period for hand-
gun purchases, and a $3.5 billion dollar scheme to put more policemen on the streets.
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however, were carved out of the Senate crime bill' 49 at the last
minute due to opposition from liberals and conservatives who
threatened the passage of the overall crime package.' The House
also rejected the habeas reform proposals due to fears that the
reforms would prevent executions.' Thus, the habeas corpus pro-
cess will remain unchanged until reform is addressed by a later
Congress.' The Habeas Corpus Reform Act was intended to be
a compromise that appeased both liberals and conservatives.,
t 3
However, while prosecutors generally favored the bill's tough puni-
tive measures, defense attorneys disliked the bill's rigorous stan-
dards."M Thus the habeas bill, if ever passed, will be the product
of considerable controversy. 5
There are two primary features of Senate Bill 1441. First, it
places an 180-day statute of limitations on habeas corpus appeals
which would run from the last day of the post-conviction appellate
proceedings.'56 A claim of new evidence is an exception to the
180-day limit.'57 Second, in exchange for the six-month limit on
habeas appeals, the bill establishes minimum standards for defense
Stephen Chapman, On Crime Congress Labors to Conceal Its Irrelevance, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 24, 1993, at C18; Naftali Bendavid, Minority Opposition Slowing Crime Legislation
Juggernaut, THE RECORDER, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1, 15.
149. S. 1607, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
150. Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 22, 1993, at Al. Habeas corpus reform was
offered as an amendment to the Senate Crime Bill but was tabled by a vote of 65 to 34.
139 CONG. REC. S15807, 15809-15 (1993). The amendment came in the form of Senate
Bill 1657, which has the same new evidence standards as Senate Bill 1441, but varies
somewhat from a few of Senate Bill 1441's provisions.
151. William J. Eaton, House Votes $13.5 Billion for State Prison Systems, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1994, at A21.
152. Michael Wines, House Votes Tough Measures as It Starts Push on Crime Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at A16.
153. Daniel Wise, House, Senate Diverge on Altering Habeas Law, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9,
1993, at Al.
154. Naftali Bendavid, Consensus Over Crime Reform Turns Fragile, N.J. L.J., Sept. 6,
1993, at 6. Some prosecutors, however, are against the habeas reforms claiming that it
will only lengthen the appeals process. This criticism is targeted at the new evidence
provision. See Marc Sandalow, Lungren Says Clinton Crime Bill Is Bad for Death Penal-
ty, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14, 1993, at A8.
155. Although habeas corpus reform has been rejected by the 103rd Congress, reform
proposals will likely reappear in the future. Even if Congress does not reform the habeas
corpus system, the evaluation of the Senate Bill 1441 standard is relevant due to its close
parallel with the new standard in Texas and the likelihood that other states, and maybe
even the federal system, will follow Texas's lead in admitting new evidence of innocence
into habeas corpus proceedings.
156. S. 1441, § 2.
157. S. 1441, § 6.
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counsel in capital cases and grants more funds for legal representa-
tion.'58
The provision that responds to Herrera makes an exception to
the six-month statute of limitations by giving constitutional status
to a claim of new evidence of innocence. It reads as follows:
For purposes of this chapter, a claim arising from a viola-
tion of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States shall include a claim by a person under sentence of
death that is based on factual allegations that, if proven
and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to demonstrate that no reasonable factfinder
would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or
that no reasonable sentencing authority would have found
an aggravating circumstance or other condition of eligibility
for the sentence. Such a claim shall be dismissed if the
facts supporting the claim were actually known to the peti-
tioner during a prior stage of the litigation in which the
claim was not raised. Notwithstanding any other provision
of this chapter, the claim shall not be subject to § 2244(b)
or the time requirements established by § 2242. In all other
respects, the claim shall be subject to the rules applicable
to claims under this chapter.'59
A series of official statements endorsing the standard for ob-
taining review of new evidence followed introduction of the bill.
Attorney General Janet Reno said the bill struck the right balance
between finality and justice.6" Deputy Associate Attorney General
Harry Litman acknowledged the standard is high but stated that
such a high standard is needed to prevent abuse. 6' Deputy Attor-
ney General Phil Heymann declared that "in light of the provisions
that allow for the consideration of new evidence, . . . the risk of
wrongly executing someone will not be greatly increased ....
158. S. 1441, § 8,9.
159. S. 1441, § 6. The Texas standard for new evidence of innocence varies in that
"would" is replaced with "could" to make the Texas standard an even more difficult
standard to meet than Senate Bill 1441. State ex. rel. Holmes, No. 71,764, 1994 WL
135476, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1994). The "would vs. could" debate is the
subject of an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. See Taylor, supra note 134 and accom-
panying text.
160. Attorney General Janet Reno Interviewed (National Public Radio radio broadcast,
Aug. 12, 1993).
161. Savage, supra note 20, at A12.
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Anything that brings an end to review sometimes increases the
chafice that sometime someone will be wrongly executed."'62
While the official statements regarding the new evidence provi-
sion were expectedly praiseworthy, several criticisms are apparent.
The shortcomings of Senate Bill 1441's new evidence provision are
primarily twofold. First, the standard itself is too high to make any
real difference.'63 It will merely "rubber stamp" the Supreme
Court's approach in Herrera and Blair of summarily rejecting
claims of innocence couched in affidavits because a reasonable
factfinder can always dismiss allegations in affidavits when com-
pared with sworn testimony from trial."6 Even prosecutors ac-
knowledge that "no reasonable factfinder" is a difficult standard to
meet, 65 as does the United States Attorney General's Office it-
self."
The harshness of this standard can be illustrated by three hypo-
thetical situations in which a death sentence is undeserved but still
would be upheld under the "no reasonable factfinder" test. 67
First, the principle aggravating circumstance presented in the penal-
ty phase of a defendant's capital trial is a rape that is later proved
false in a habeas petition. Despite this evidence, a reasonable jury
could still have sentenced the defendant to death if another less in-
flammatory aggravating circumstance existed. 68  Second,
defendant's counsel fails to present mitigating evidence at the pen-
alty phase which, more probably than not, would have resulted in a
life sentence, but again a reasonable jury could have given the
death sentence.'69 Third, jurors in a capital trial are bribed to im-
pose the death penalty, but the evidence sustains a reasonable
162. White House -Special Briefing, Federal News Service, Aug. 11, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Federal News Service File.
163. Senate Bill 1441's standard, however, is probably not as high as the "extraordinari-
ly high" showing the majority opinion in Herrera contemplated. See Herrera v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993).
164. See Ultimate hnocence and the Ultimate Penalty, THE RECORDER, Apr. 14, 1993,
at 8 (noting that Herrera seemed to require that a showing of innocence be made before
any discovery is ordered and that a "probably innocent" standard would not have such an
unrealistic result). This article reported on a congressional hearing in which Walter
McMillian and Randall Dale Adams, another person wrongfully sentenced to death,
pleaded with Congress to enact Metzenbaum's "probably innocent" standard for granting
hearings for new evidence. Id.
165. Bendavid, supra note 154 and accompanying text.
166. See Savage, supra note 20, at A12; see also supra text accompanying note 161.
167. In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 770 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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jury's verdict of capital punishment.Y°
In these situations, the reasonableness standard of Senate Bill
1441 allows a judge to affirm the death sentence. These examples
of new evidence are not entitled to a hearing under Senate Bill
1441 even though they suggest the likelihood of an improperly
imposed death sentence. Only exculpatory evidence which is irrec-
oncilable with the conviction or eligibility for the death sentence
guarantees an evidentiary hearing under Senate Bill 1441's stan-
dards.' 7' Justice and the heightened reliability demanded of capital
punishment should lead Congress to enact a less rigorous standard
for claims of new evidence of innocence in order to remedy this
flaw inherent in Senate Bill 1441.
The second major flaw with the standard is that the rationale
behind the provision rescuing the innocent is rendered moot by
Senate Bill 1441's statute of limitations on filing habeas claims. By
the time new evidence is discovered, most death row inmates may
have already been executed under Senate Bill 1441's time limits on
habeas. Historically, there has been a great time lag between con-
viction and discovery of exculpatory evidence.' 2 The current lag
between conviction and execution is six to nine years.'73 A delay
in the system is needed to ensure certainty. 7 4 Some scholars even
assert that the 180-day limit is unconstitutional. 5 Constitutional-
ity aside, the 180-day limit will adversely impact upon the accura-
cy of judgments given the increased pace of executions which will
likely result.
170. Id. This hypothetical may have occurred in reality. The State of Georgia recently
executed William Henry Hance despite a juror's affidavit that she did not vote for execu-
tion. The State Killings Continue, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 6, 1994, at 6B.
171. See Sullivan, supra note 100, at 321 (discussing the standard advocated by Justice
White in Herrera which is almost identical to Senate Bill 1441's standard).
172. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117, at 71 (establishing that
in nearly half of the surveyed cases of innocent convictions, discovery of error took over
five years); Joseph M. Giarratano, 'To the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been
Wrong': Fallibility v. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J. 1005, 1010 (1990-
1991).
173. See Bendavid, supra note 114, at 6 (stating that the current delay is nine and one-
half years); Berger, supra note 31, at 1665 (stating that it takes between six and one-half
years and over eight years); Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas
Corpus, 56 ALB. L. REv. 225, 225 (1992) (stating it takes between six and seven years).
174. Morris, supra note 113, at 378.
175. See Mello & Duffy, supra note 37, at 460 (noting that habeas has never been re-
stricted with a "statute of limitations" and arguing that such a limitation would be uncon-
stitutional under the suspension clause given the importance of habeas in protecting the
rights of criminal defendants).
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VII. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE NEW EVIDENCE PROVISION IN
SENATE BILL 1441
While Congress's idea of reversing Herrera and providing a
hearing for innocence claims is laudable, Senate Bill 1441 does not
go far enough to protect against the execution of innocent defen-
dants. Its standard is too low and the 180-day limit on habeas
appeals will rush justice before the discovery of new evidence of
innocence. This section proposes a viable alternative to Senate Bill
1441's new evidence provision that would both increase the likeli-
hood that a capital defendant will receive a hearing for justifiable
claims of new evidence and decrease the chances that such hear-
ings will be necessary, while also preserving the interests of finali-
ty.'76 The following proposal for reducing the risk that innocents
are executed consists of two parts: improving Senate Bill 1441's
standard for obtaining review of new evidence of innocence and
instituting a series of reforms which improves the reliability of the
system that sentences too many innocent men to death.
A. An Alternative Standard
The best standard for achieving hearings for meritorious new
evidence claims is the "probably innocent" standard77 espoused
in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera.. and embodied in a
bill introduced to the Senate by former Senator Howard
Metzenbaum' 79 The new evidence should be enough to establish
176. Note that the only way to eliminate the risk that innocents are executed is to
abolish capital punishment since implementation of capital punishment by humans will
always be a fallible exercise. See Callins v. Callins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 n.8 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Robert R. Bryan, The Execution of the Innocent: The Tragedy
of the Hauptmann-Lindbergh and Bigelow Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE
831, 870 (1990-1991); Giarratano, supra note 172, at 1009; IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE,
supra note 117, at 279.
177. This standard was first formutlated by Judge Henry J. Friendly in his seminal ar-
ticle on the role of innocence in habeas corpus. Judge Friendly advocated that federal
habeas petitioners be required to show a fair probability, based on all available evidence,
that the trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt about petitioner's guilt.
Henry J. Friendly, Is innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CH. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970).
178. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 882-83 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. S. 221, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter S. 221]. Metzenbaum opposes
any time limit on habeas appeals and introduced this bill two days after the Herrera
decision. 139 CONG. REc. 774, 775-76 (1993). Metzenbaum's bill amends § 1651 of Title
28, U.S.C., and reads in relevant part:
(c)(l) At any time, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a district
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that based on all the old and new evidence, the petitioner is either
probably innocent of the underlying crime itself or probably unde-
serving of the sentence of death.'8° The new evidence could have
either been exculpatory evidence available at trial but not known to
the defendant, or evidence which has surfaced since trial that con-
tradicts the evidence presented at trial or sentencing. This standard
would require the evidence to be weighed, and would prevent the
examples of Senate Bill 1441's loopholes by ensuring that only
meritorious claims of innocence be heard. 8'
The burden of proving probable innocence should be on the
petitioner since he now carries the presumption of guilt; it is not
up to the government to reprove his guilt.8 ' However, the facts
asserted in the application for an evidentiary hearing should be
seen in the light most favorable to the petitioner.'83 This slanted
view of the facts, which would disappear once an evidentiary hear-
ing is granted, prevents a court from automatically dismissing facts
presented in affidavits, as was done in Herrera and Blair. More-
over, the law gives facts a more favorable interpretation in certain
court shall issue any appropriate writ or relief on behalf of an applicant under
sentence of death, imposed either in Federal or in State court, who establishes
that he is probably innocent of the offense for which the death sentence was
imposed.
(2) On receipt of an application filed pursuant to paragraph (1), a district court
shall promptly stay the applicant's execution pending consideration of the ap-
plication and, upon an unfavorable disposition, until the court's action is af-
firmed on direct review.
(3) The court shall dismiss the application, unless it alleges fact, supported by
sworn affidavits or documentary evidence, that
(A) could not have been discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence in time to be presented at trial; and
(B) if proven, would establish that the applicant is probably innocent.
S. 221, supra. Note that Senate Bill 221 requires a "due diligence" standard for the dis-
covery of evidence at the trial phase. Id. This is a more difficult standard to satisfy than
Senate Bill 1441's requirement of "actual knowledge." Also Senate Bill 221 does not
provide review for claims that the death sentence is undeserved.
180. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. A similar standard would be Eric Freedman's "probable cause" standard which
would also have the advantage of carrying a well-developed body of law. Eric M. Freed-
man, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two Legislative Proposals for Evaluat-
ing Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N. Y. U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 315, 320-21 (1990-1991). This standard grants an evidentiary hearing if
"probable cause" exists to believe that the jury's verdict on defendant's guilt or sentence
might change based on the new evidence. Id. at 320.
182. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. Cf. Morris, supra note 113, at 386 n.77 (advocating a presumption that the facts
asserted by the petitioner are true).
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situations, as for example in a motion for summary judgment
which requires evidence be seen in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party."8 The irrevocability of the death sentence
heightens the need for certainty; therefore, the petitioner deserves a
fair reading of his new facts. Some may object out of concern for
the need for finality in judgments; but, once new facts of inno-
cence surface, any judgment needs reexamining to assure its validi-
ty. These same considerations support a rule that once the peti-
tioner has made a showing of probable innocence and received an
evidentiary hearing, he should only be required to prove his inno-
cence by a preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.'85
Another feature of the standard for obtaining a hearing for new
evidence should be the "actual knowledge" standard which is al-
ready incorporated in Senate Bill 1441. The petitioner must prove
that there was no actual knowledge" 6 of this new evidence at the
time of trial. This feature prevents the abuse of the new evidence
claim as a strategy to delay the execution process. It is preferable
to the "due diligence" standard advocated by Senator
Metzenbaum's bill. A "due diligence" standard is too high con-
sidering the petitioner is claiming innocence in a capital appeal.1
8 7
Some may object to the extension of this proposal to claims of
new evidence that the death sentence was undeserved. Such an ex-
tension is necessary, however, to prevent miscarriages of jus-
tice.' Senate Bill 1441 wisely allows new evidence of ineligibil-
ity for the death sentence.'89 While evidence tending to prove in-
eligibility for the death sentence is not as delineated as evidence of
innocence of the actual crime, justice demands a chance to present
184. See 6 JAMEs WILLIAM MOORE, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.02[l] (2d ed.
1993) (discussing Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
185. See Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 387
(1993) (discussing the standard for obtaining relief for bare-innocence claims and advocat-
ing the preponderance of evidence standard out of fairness to the petitioner). "
186. This actual knowledge requirement should also include those presumably rare in-
stances of "willful blindness" in which evidence is ignored in hopes that it can be raised
in habeas proceedings if a conviction is obtained.
187. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 446 (stating that mechanisms, such as due dilligence
requirements, whereby the states try to achieve finality "should be trumped by the claims
of the innocent prisoner" whenever a showing of innocence is made, just as procedural
default and successive petitions are trumped by innocence).
188. Id. at 447.
189. Senator Metzenbaum's bill, Senate Bill 221, does not provide for this. See supra
note 179 and accompanying text.
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evidence of ineligibility so persons who do not legally qualify for
the death sentence are not executed.'O Examples of death ineligi-
bility would include evidence negating an aggravating factor of the
crime or evidence of a compelling new mitigating factor.'
Implementation of this standard for obtaining evidentiary hear-
ings for both the underlying offense and the sentence of death
should not be unduly disruptive or burdensome to the federal
courts. First, the number of death row inmates who would be able
to make such claims is not great.' 2  Moreover, the Supreme
Court's contention in Herrera that such an avenue of relief would
be one of the most disruptive blows to the federal court system'93
ignores the fact that the present delay in habeas litigation is due
not to substantive Eighth Amendment claims, such as factual inno-
cence, but to claims deriving from the Court's maze of procedural
limitations on habeas corpus.' Currently, assertions of innocence
are couched in complicated procedural arguments.' Assessing a
factual claim is both less complicated than claims under the current
complex habeas law and less time-consuming since the standard of
review is higher.196
Second, if the Supreme Court does not want to burden the
federal courts with such claims, it could constitutionally mandate
that state courts follow the example of Texas and re-examine their
laws to provide an avenue for new evidence claims on the grounds
190. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 447.
191. See id. Ledewitz gives the examples of new evidence where the capital defendant
was not the triggerman and mitigating evidence that a member of the capital defendant's
family was supplied illegal drugs by the victim and died as a result.
192. Id. Recall that the total percentage of civil cases in federal court which are habeas
petitions is only 5%. Lay, supra note 33, at 1043 n.162. Furthermore, this proposal only
concerns capital cases with new evidence claims. See supra note 179 and accompanying
text.
193. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 861 (1993).
194. See Hoffmann, supra note 37, at 834 (arguing that the root of the problem with
habeas litigation is the complexity of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment procedural
rules); Lay, supra note 33, at 1018-19 (stating that the only way to expedite habeas cases
is to radically change the procedural rules of habeas corpus law); Steiker, supra note 185,
at 387-88 (asserting that allowing claims of bare-innocence would simplify and reduce
habeas litigation because current habeas doctrine encourages petitioners to manufacture
claims of actual innocence).
195. See Freedman, supra note 181, at 321 (giving the examples of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims, Brady violation claims, and sentencing error claims).
196. One author has argued that the Supreme Court's emphasis on innocence in its
habeas jurisprudence dictates that the Court should allow for actual innocence claims when
states do not provide for meaningful review of such claims. See Steiker, supra note 185,
at 370-71.
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that it is unconstitutional to execute an innocent man. 97 Also,
rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing at the district court
level, should one be granted, the district court could remand for
the state courts to review the new evidence.
98
Third, the standard of review for a denial of a petition for new
evidence should be a high standard similar to reviewing a denial of
a motion for judgment as a matter of law in order to prevent an
endless stream of appeals."9 The district court is most capable of
assessing new evidence claims given its experience in the fact
finding role. Collectively, these three elements should ease fears of
perpetual appeals and abuse of claims of innocence based on new
evidence. However, when the choice is between speed in execu-
tions or justice, justice should prevail as a matter of principle.
B. A Preventive Proposal
The second aspect of this proposal is a preventive, rather than
remedial, solution to the problem. By improving the reliability of
the system which convicts innocents, the need for hearings for new
evidence of innocence will be greatly reduced. The proposed re-
forms are for capital cases only and would therefore not greatly
impact the criminal justice system. These reforms also counteract
the effect of the proposed 180-day limit on habeas appeals should
it ever be enacted.
Initially, the causes for erroneous convictions need to be out-
lined. Bedau and Radelet detailed many of the causes for erroneous
convictions and found that three of the leading origins of error
were prosecutorial misconduct in suppressing exculpatory evidence,
police misconduct in coercing false confessions, and witness error
through either mistaken identity or perjured testimony.2' Reforms
thus need to be channeled towards addressing these problems.
197. See Sullivan, supra note 100, at 319 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Herrera asserting that the Court might have held that Texas must provide a vehicle for
litigation of newly discovered evidence claims).
198. Constitutionally requiring states to provide for such hearings would be preferable to
the plan suggested by Freedman, supra note 181. at 321, that popular opinion, once
aware of potential injustices, would mandate that states alter any procedural bars to such
evidentiary hearings.
199. See id. at 323 (arguing for such a standard of review).
200. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117, at 57.
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1. Combating Prosecutorial Misconduct
Two fundamental reforms can be adopted to combat prosecuto-
rial misconduct.2 0' First, stronger deterrent measures are needed to
keep prosecutors from withholding evidence or presenting false
evidence.20 2 Under the Brady doctrine, 203  prosecutors must dis-
close exculpatory evidence to the defense and attempt to rectify
false evidence.2" While complying with the Brady doctrine is a
constitutional requirement, the only real deterrence prosecutors face
for Brady-type misconduct is the chance that the convicted defen-
dant will receive a new trial.25 There are a host of provisions
which could be imposed on prosecutors for violating the ethical
codes which prohibit Brady-type behavior, 2' but research shows
that these sanctions are few and far between.27 The rarity of
201. Bedau and Radelet's evidence of prosecutorial misconduct as a leading cause of
wrongful death sentences is further supported by recent examples. See Bedau & Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117; supra text accompanying note 200. Walter
McMillian's release from death row after his fifth appeal was largely due to a tape, sup-
pressed by the prosecutor but uncovered by McMillian's attorney, in which a witness
complained of being coerced into framing McMillian. Cris Carmody, The Brady Rule: Is
It Working?, NAT'L L. J., May 17, 1993, at 1, 30. Kenneth Griffin's death sentence was
also vacated due to the prosecutor withholding investigative records. Id. The Carmody ar-
ticle also quotes Prof. Bennett L. Gershman of Pace University School of Law as saying
"I think it's fair to say in many if not most of the major cases that have gotten publicity
for a wrongful conviction, it's revealed that the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evi-
dence." Id.
202. This reform would be advantageous for the integrity of the entire criminal justice
system and need not be limited to capital cases.
203. The Brady doctrine gets its name from the landmark decision in Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant facing the
death penalty, who maintained he was not the triggerman, had his due process rights
violated because the prosecutor suppressed evidence of a confession to the shooting by
the defendant's partner. The Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. at 87. However, the Court did not reverse the conviction since the sup-
pressed evidence was admissible only on the issue of punishment. Id. at 90-91.
204. Cf Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Viola-
tions: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 696-97 (1987) (examining the rules which
attempt, but fail, to enforce the Brady doctrine).
205. Id. at 731-32.
206. For instance, contempt citations, criminal prosecution, removal from office, and
disbarment are some of the strongest means of punishing prosecutors for Brady violations.
Id. at 703; see also, JOINT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS 32-43 (1983) (listing possible disposi-
tions and sanctions for attorney misconduct). Punishments can be as minor as an admoni-
tion or probation. Id. at 38-39.
207. Rosen, supra note 204, at 703, 716-31 (reporting on survey of all available print
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sanctions negates any real deterrent value. Given the large number
of Brady violations,2"' imposition of stronger sanctions on prose-
cutors is needed to deter such behavior. Deterrence can be
achieved by greater reporting of Brady violators by defense
attorneys29 or by altering the disciplinary procedures so investiga-
tion of Brady misconduct does not require formal complaints. 0
Furthermore, bar disciplinary boards and judges should put some
teeth into the Brady rule by imposing sanctions when needed.2 '
The second reform to curb prosecutorial misconduct is to man-
date open file policies for prosecutors in capital cases. Historically,
the criminal justice system has been saddled with restrictive discov-
ery processes.2 2 Currently, there are a growing number of advo-
cates for liberalization of discovery rules. 3 In response to the ar-
guments for liberalized discovery and as a means of complying
with the Brady doctrine, six states now require open prosecutorial
files in capital cases.2 4 The American Bar Association's Criminal
material and questionnaires submitted to all bar disciplinary agencies revealing that, in the
25 years after Brady, discipline for Brady violators was considered in only nine cases).
208. See id. at 697-703 (presenting a recent catalog of reported state and federal cases
involving Brady violations); see also Charles Aron, Comment, Prosecutorial Misconduct: A
National Survey, '21 DEPAUL L. REv. 422 (1971) (cataloging prosecutorial misconduct
cases).
209. See Carmody, supra note 201, at 30 (referring to defense attorneys who admit they
should be more aggressive in reporting Brady violations).
210. See Rosen, supra note 204, at 735-36 (noting that reliance on defense attorneys to
report Brady violations is misplaced and bar disciplinary bodies should review cases in-
volving Brady violations).
211. One district court judge attempted to do so by ordering the government to pay the
litigation costs of the defendant as a result of Brady violations; however, this sanction
was reversed on appeal. See U.S. v. Woodley, 9 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 1993).
212. See Rosen, supra note 204, at 695 n.4 (contrasting the pro-disclosure civil discov-
ery rules with the minimal discovery available to criminal defendants).
213. In the civil system, discovery rules have been greatly enlarged to the point of
mandatory disclosure. See John C. Koski, Mandatory Disclosure, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at
85, 85 (stating that under the amendments to Federal Rule 26, litigants seeking informa-
tion need only wait for it). In the criminal system, academics are increasingly calling for
liberalization of the criminal discovery process. See Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of
Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the Administration of Criminal Justice in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 641, 645 (1989)
(arguing for broader pre-trial discovery in criminal cases as a means of stream-lining the
costs and time involved in the criminal justice system); Linda S. Eads, Adjudication by
Ambush: Federal Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific Experts in a System of Limited Crimi-
nal Discovery, 67 N.C. L. REV. 577, 621 (1989) (proposing an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which would provide for discovery of all nonscientific and
scientific experts); Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence and DNA, 44
VAND. L. REV. 791, 799-800 (1991) (explaining the appeal of liberalized defense discov-
ery of scientific evidence).
214. Carmody, supra note 201, at 30. The states are Maryland, Florida, Colorado, Ore-
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Justice System is also waging a campaign to establish such policies
nationwide.215 Open file policies 16 would eliminate the problem
of prosecutors not complying with the Brady doctrine, would give
defendants a greater chance to obtain justice, and would add only a
small amount of time and expense to the system.217
2. Combating Police Misconduct
As revealed by Bedau and Radelet's study and empirical re-
search since that time, false confessions obtained through police
coercion remain a major problem.218 Many believe that the
Miranda rule"9 has failed to deter police coercion.121 To pre-
gon, New Hampshire, and Alabama. Id.
215. Id.
216. Open file policies do not include a prosecutor's work product. Id.
217. But see Steven A. Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1462-64 (1987) (arguing that such open file policies will en-
courage prosecutors not to pursue any evidence which may help the defendant). Reiss
suggests one alternative to open file policies is to compel judges to review all prosecuto-
rial files in deciding which information falls under the Brady doctrine and which does
not. Id. at 1464-65. Reiss dismisses this alternative because of the immense burden it
would place on the system. Id.
218. See Corey J. Ayling, Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis
of Legal Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1121, 1155-79 (1984)
(surveying psychological and sociological literature to conclude that false confessions,
whether physically or psychologically coerced, are prevalent enough to justify additional
legal safeguards).
219. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that procedural pro-
tective devices are necessary when a person is in police custody to ensure that person is
free from police coercion and aware of his free choice and that failure to use such pro-
tective devices will result in the inadmissibility of statements obtained from the person in
custody).
220. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic
Rule Against Self Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 956-59 (1988) (cataloging criti-
cisms of the Miranda rule for its ineffectiveness in deterring police coercion). Cf. Daniel
J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs
and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 269 (1988) (argu-
ing in the context of the exclusionary rule that deterrence of police coercion is the perva-
sive rationale of the courts).
Note also that the usefulness of the Miranda rule and the deterrence of police coer-
cion have been severely restricted by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), in
which the Supreme Court held that the rule of harmless error on appeal applies to the
erroneous admission of coerced confessions. Id. at 308. But see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Hann of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced
Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 154 (1991) (calling the application of the harmless
error rule "wrong"). Cf. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra, at 963 (forecasting that the cur-
rent onslaught against the Miranda rule could lead "full circle on the confession issue,
and we will be forced to resolve once again how best to assure that police interrogation
does not become the foundation for an underground inquisitorial system").
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vent false confessions from leading to erroneous death sentences, a
wise reform would prohibit the death penalty when a capital defen-
dant has confessed. Some commentators have advocated a more
restrictive rule of banning all confessions from court and applying
that to all cases-not just capital cases.22' Forbidding the death
penalty once a defendant has confessed would reduce the number
of erroneous death sentences, force the prosecution to prove its
case, and deter police coercion. Moreover, studies show that such a
rule would rarely result in guilty persons going free.222
3. Combating Witness Error
According to the Bedau and Radelet study, witness error
through mistaken identity and perjury is the greatest cause of erro-
neous convictions. 23 Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the risks of eyewitness testimony: "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife
with instances of mistaken identification., ,2 4 To prevent the over-
influence of witness error in erroneous convictions, one of two re-
forms can be implemented.
First, independent corroboration could be required in order for
the testimony of one eyewitness to be admitted into evidence in a
capital trial.' Ancient Talmudic law required the testimony of
221. See Richard H. Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Viewl's on
Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 235 (1966) (reasoning that a more in-
depth reflection on the Fifth Amendment would lead the Supreme Court to prohibit con-
fessions in the adversary system). Cf. Ayling, supra note 218, at 1199-200, 1203-04 (re-
viewing the benefits of banning confessions but concluding that outlawing confessions on
reliability grounds alone is not justified; however, such an alternative may be justified on
broader Fifth Amendment grounds). Jewish law also generally forbids confessions as evi-
dence of guilt. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 220, at 974.
222. See Ayling, supra note 218, at 1198-99 (observing that in most cases, confessions
are not necessary in order for the prosecution to prove its case because prosecutors have
alternative investigation means available and suspects usually confess only in light of
overwhelming evidence against them). Ayling also mentions other, less drastic, potential
reforms such as requiring an attorney to be present during all police questioning, requiring
video or audio taping of interrogation and confessions, and requiring judges rather than
juries to assess the corroboration requirements under a higher standard. Id. at 1198, 1202-
03.
223. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117, at 57. Recent studies
also indicate that more than half of all wrongful convictions in the U.S. are caused by
witness error. MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY 98-99 (1991).
224. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
225. See ELIZABETH F. LoFTus, EYEwITNESS TESTIMONY 188 (1979) (exploring such an
option for all criminal cases, but concluding that such a rule would remove decisions
from juries, would cause someone to decide what constitutes corroborating evidence, and
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two witnesses.226 Such a rule, however, is disadvantageous since
not all eyewitness testimony is unreliable.
A less arbitrary reform would permit expert witnesses to testify
in capital cases on the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifi-
cation.227 This would educate the jury on the "vagaries of eyewit-
ness identification" and could reverse the tendency of juries to
overvalue eyewitness evidence.228 Capital cases should have a pre-
sumption in favor of admitting expert testimony on the unreliability
of eyewitness identification in order to reduce the large number of
wrongful convictions based on witness error. 9
4. Combating Error in General
Bedau and Radelet found several other causes of wrongful
convictions.2 ' These causes, as well as the previously mentioned
causes, are producing a criminal justice system which makes too
many mistakes. In order to preserve the integrity of the system and
would pose problems where only one eyewitness, however reliable, existed); PATRICK M.
WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 182-193 (1965) (proposing a
"qualitative" rule of corroboration).
226. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117, at 87.
227. Courts have already indicated a willingness to allow such expert testimony as long
as certain criteria are met. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53
(9th Cir. 1973) (setting forth four criteria to determine the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny on eyewitness evidence); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223-24 (Ariz. 1983) (en
banc) (holding exclusion of expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion an abuse of the trial court's discretion); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 726-27
(Cal. 1984) (en banc) (finding prejudicial error in trial court's exclusion of expert testimo-
ny on eyewitness identifications).
228. See Christopher M. Walters, Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewit-
ness Identification, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1402, 1404 n.12 (1985) (detailing the empirical
research indicating that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony).
229. See Cindy J. O'Hagan, Note, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewvit-
ness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 771 (1993) (arguing for such a presumption in
all criminal cases). Another author suggested fashioning a constitutional due process right
to expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification. See Benjamin E.
Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial Identification
Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. L.J. 259, 315 (1990-1991). Cf. Steven I.
Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 165, 223 (1989-1990) (proposing a rule governing the admissibility of expert evi-
dence on witness credibility which generally prohibits admission of such evidence but
allows the expert testimony when it is offerred by the accused and the court determines
its probative value is of sufficient weight and centrality to the case).
230. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117, at 57. Although not as
frequent, the other causes of error are: misleading circumstantial evidence, incompetent de-
fense counsel, judicial refusal to admit exculpatory evidence, little consideration of alibi
evidence, erroneous judgment on cause of death, false guilty plea of defendant, and com-
munity outrage demanding a conviction. Id.
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to protect the innocent, two additional reforms are suggested.
First, it is well documented that better legal representation is
needed at the trial level to ensure that mistakes are not made, as
well as for capital defendants in their habeas petitions.23' In fact,
the American Bar Association Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas
Corpus lists the inadequacy of counsel as the chief failure of the
capital punishment system. 2  Senate Bill 1441 wisely ac-
knowledges this problem by establishing minimum standards of
attorney competence and experience in capital cases and, in turn,
by providing increased funding for counsel in capital cases. 3
This type of reform is imperative given the poor legal representa-
tion faced by capital defendants and the Supreme Court's unwill-
ingness to adequately address errors caused by attorney incompe-
tence. ' In light of the control attorneys have over a capital
defendant's fate, guaranteeing each capital defendant competent
representation at trial and appeal may be the most effective reform
to ensure that innocent persons are not executed while restoring
integrity to the capital punishment system.
Second, to provide as much certainty as possible in capital
convictions, the requirements for death sentences that are based on
circumstantial evidence should be heightened. 5 This was former-
231. See generally Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be
Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993) (ex-
pounding on the poor assistance of counsel representing indigent criminal defendants as a
result of inadequate compensation); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 325 (docu-
menting the importance of competent counsel in the penalty phase following the capital
trial); American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section: Report to the House of Dele-
gates: Recommendations, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 9, 9-12 (1990) [hereinafter ABA Report]
(proposing 16 recommendations for improving implementation of the death penalty, six of
which focus on enhancing the quality of legal representation); Michael Mello, Facing
Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REV.
513, 585-606 (1988) (singling out the State of Florida for exploration of the crisis in
legal representation at the post-conviction stage of capital cases).
232. ABA Report, supra note 231, at 16.
233. See S. 1441, § 8-9..
234. See, e.g., Murray v. Girratano, 492 U.S. 1, 109 (1989) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to an attorney in a state post-conviction proceeding); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991) (refusing to allow federal habeas review for capital
petitioner because his attorney filed the notice of appeal three days late). But see
McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568, 2574 (1994) (holding there is a right to counsel at
the preapplication phase of a habeas proceeding).
235. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra note 117, at 87-88 (exploring
the possibility of barring the death penalty where the conviction was based solely on
either circumstantial evidence or the defendant's confession, but ultimately concluding that
such options are unlikely to find favor with legislatures, jurists, or prosecutors). Edwin
19951
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ly part of Ohio common law but was not applicable in federal
habeas corpus cases.236 The Model Penal Code goes even further
by requiring a higher standard of proof in capital cases. Under the
Model Penal Code, a death sentence can only be given when the
evidence "foreclose[s] all doubt respecting the defendant's
guilt. 237
There are a host of other reforms which could be adopted to
improve the capital sentencing process and the criminal justice
system in general, but the ones mentioned in this Note are chan-
neled toward preventing innocents from being sentenced to death.
These types of reforms will reduce the burden on the federal courts
from examining the increasing number of innocence claims, coun-
teract the effect of speedier executions if the 180-day time limit is
enacted, and restore integrity to a system making too many mis-
takes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given the finality of capital punishment and the metaphor it
represents for the entire American system of justice, justice de-
mands that the system get it right if the death penalty is to be
administered. Ensuring that innocent persons are not executed is a
fundamental obligation of justice. Anglo-American criminal law is
premised on the belief that the rights of innocents should be pro-
tected at the expense of letting the guilty go free.23' But such a
Borchard advocates that the death sentence should not be given based solely on circum-
stantial evidence, but Bedau and Radelet disagree with this, saying such a rule would
prevent few, if any, wrongful convictions in capital cases. Id. Jewish law also prohibited
circumstantial evidence from establishing guilt, but this Note does not propose such a
radical change. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt: Henry Friendly
Meets the MaHaRaL of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REv. 604, 616 (1991) (explaining Jewish
law's deep concern with factual rather than legal guilt).
236. York v. Tate, 858 F.2d 322, 330 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1049
(1989). In State v. Kulig, 309 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ohio 1974) the rule was stated that
where "circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon to prove an element essential to a
finding of guilt, it must be consistent only with the theory of guilt and irreconcilable with
any reasonable theory of innocence." This point, however, was overruled in State v.
Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 502 (Ohio 1991).
237. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(f) (1962). Another wise reform concerning the
standard of proof would be to require the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in the
sentencing phase of capital trials. See Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Standard in Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 195, 215-21 (1991) (arguing for such a reform).
238. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358 ("[I]t is better that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent man suffer."); In re Winship, 387 U.S. 358,
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premise may be a relic of the past when viewed in light of
Herrera and those who say execution of innocents is a rational
cost of the death penalty.
The ultimate question is whether American society will tolerate
the execution of innocents to achieve comity between federal and
state courts, finality in judgments, and a less congested court sys-
tem. Given the protests following Herrera, the legislative reply of
Senate Bill 1441, and the change in Texas law by the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, there is still hope that the answer is "No."
However, Senate Bill 1441 was rejected by Congress, and the
change in Texas law is being appealed. The federal courts, through
habeas corpus, should be responsible for protecting innocents by
providing for review of petitions for hearings to evaluate new
evidence of innocence. Senate Bill 1441's provisions and the new
standard under Texas law are not good enough. A petitioner claim-
ing innocence based on new evidence should be able to secure an
evidentiary hearing if he can prove that he is probably innocent. In
addition, extra safeguards should be adopted to reduce the risk of
executing innocents by improving the reliability of the system
which sentences too many innocent men to death. Maybe then the
American criminal justice system will no longer be open to charges
of "state murder." 9
TARA L. SWAFFORD
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man that to let a guilty man go free.").
239. See Harrington, supra note 7. at A25 (using the term to describe the type of ac-
tions the Court's decision in Herrera would sanction).
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